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I. INTRODUCTION
 In its early years, civil recourse theory offered a unified approach 
to tort law.1 As its applications have spread, and as its adherents 
have grown in number, this is no longer true. Civil recourse theory 
now incorporates several distinct approaches to private law topics, 
and some of these approaches diverge in important respects.2 As it 
has developed, civil recourse theory has become a collection of theories.3
? Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, DePaul University Col-
lege of Law. I wish to thank participants in the Symposium on Civil Recourse Theory at 
The Florida State University College of Law for helpful comments. I also thank John Gold-
berg for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Any errors are my own. 
 1. The seminal article is Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the 
Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Rights]. See also Benjamin 
Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 623-655 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
Zipursky, Private Law]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 
GEO. L.J. 695 (2003) [hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]. Recent additional works by 
Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg are, presumably, also well within the orthodoxy of 
civil recourse theory. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: 
Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) 
(suggesting a constitutional grounding for a right to redress); John C.P. Goldberg & Ben-
jamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1162 (2007) [here-
inafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Moral Luck]; John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts 
as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs].
 2. For theories that arguably diverge from the standard civil recourse approach see, 
for example, Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1873 (2011) (describing private rights of action in loss allocation terms); Nathan B. 
Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 529 (2011) (describing recourse in terms of retaliation in contract settings); Anthony 
J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957 (2007) (describing 
recourse in terms of revenge in punitive damages settings); Jason M. Solomon, Equal 
Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765 (2009) (offering, arguably, a 
functionalist view of civil recourse); and Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Re-
course Theorists, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107 (2011) (suggesting that civil recourse may be a 
component of the best corrective justice account, not a competitor to it). 
 3. The nature of these intramural disputes should be familiar to corrective justice 
theorists. While there are certain common features, corrective justice approaches to private 
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 This Article shows how civil recourse theory has ramified. Both 
the conceptions of recourse and the remedies implicated by those con-
ceptions are distinct from one theory to another. This Article further 
suggests that these divergences are not fatal to civil recourse theory, 
and indeed may represent a strength of the approach. If civil recourse 
theory is sufficiently flexible, it can account for fields as disparate as 
tort, contract, and unjust enrichment. It can also account for remedi-
al variations within those fields. Civil recourse theory may help ex-
plain why remedies are typically focused on expectation damages in 
contract law, while in tort law they range from nominal relief to pu-
nitive damages. 
 Part I explains the principle of civil recourse in general terms and 
provides a brief summary of civil recourse theory in its traditional 
form. Part II shows that there are now several distinct civil recourse 
theories, each of which diverges in important ways from the others. A 
crucial concern for each theory is to define what it means for one per-
son to “act against” another.4 There is a spectrum of potential civil 
recourse conceptions, including: (1) a form of recourse concerned with 
the enforcement of primary or remedial rights, (2) a form of recourse 
concerned with holding defendants accountable for their wrongs, and 
(3) a form of recourse concerned with private revenge. This Part ex-
plains the differences between these conceptions. Part III discusses 
the challenges that these divergent approaches produce. This Part 
also suggests how a pluralist approach—one located within a civil re-
course rubric—might address these challenges. Part IV then concludes. 
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF CIVIL RECOURSE
 To begin, we need a basic idea of what civil recourse theory is. Civil 
recourse theory originated in the tort setting, with a focus on explain-
ing the conceptual basis of tort law. Like corrective justice approach-
es, civil recourse theory emphasizes the rights and duties immanent 
in private law reasoning.5 A key feature of the civil recourse account, 
however, is that it also emphasizes the role of private rights of ac-
tion.6 On the civil recourse view, where one individual violates the 
                                                                                                                  
law differ in a variety of ways. See Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 
ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 19 (1995) (describing significant variations among corrective justice ac-
counts of tort law). Civil recourse theory now shows a similar variance. 
 4. This is not the only way in which recent civil recourse theories may diverge. There is 
some indication that there are also methodological distinctions. Zipursky, for example, adopts 
a pragmatic conceptualist approach to civil recourse theory. Cf. Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457 (2000) (describing pragmatic conceptual-
ism and reasons for adopting such an approach). Some civil recourse theorists, however, 
have assessed civil recourse in terms that suggest a more functionalist understanding. 
 5. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 1, at 742. 
 6. See id. at 746-47. 
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rights of another, the wronged party is entitled to seek recourse in a 
court of law by initiating a private right of action. In other words, 
private law is designed so that a wronged party may act against the 
wrongdoer through a state-provided venue. 
 Benjamin Zipursky provides a helpful statement of the core prin-
ciple undergirding civil recourse theory: 
By recognizing a legal right of action against a tortfeasor, our sys-
tem respects the principle that the plaintiff is entitled to act 
against one who has legally wronged him or her. I call this the 
principle of civil recourse. The legal principle that the victim of a 
tort has a right of action against the tortfeasor is an instance of 
this more general idea.7
This principle—that a wronged party has a legal entitlement to act 
against the wrongdoer—is the central component of civil recourse theory. 
 Notably, the traditional version of this theory emphasizes redress 
of wrongs, rather than redress of wrongful losses.8 One of its 
strengths is that a right of civil recourse can then explain why there 
is such a variety of remedies in tort law.9 While corrective justice 
theories can suitably account for compensatory damages in tort law, 
many corrective justice theories struggle to explain why tort law pro-
vides for damages in cases where no wrongful losses were suffered. 
Likewise, many corrective justice theories struggle to explain puni-
tive damages. The civil recourse notion that people have a right to act 
against someone who has legally wronged them readily accounts for 
such cases.10
 Another purported strength is that civil recourse theory offers an 
explanation for the structure of tort law. Private rights of action can, 
perhaps, be explained by some corrective justice accounts, but they 
are not an obvious outcome under those approaches. Moreover, sub-
stantive standing requirements add a further challenge.11 Ordinarily, 
only one whose rights were violated will have standing to sue. A lim-
ited private right of action makes perfect sense, however, under the 
view that people should be able to act against someone who has 
 7. Id. at 735. 
 8. See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 1, at 954-57 (discussing 
torts where recourse is available, but where there is no loss capable of being shifted). 
 9. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 1, at 710-13 (noting how corrective justice 
accounts struggle with the diversity of remedies in tort law); id. at 748-52 (discussing the 
applicability of civil recourse theory to the diversity of remedies in tort law). 
 10.  Some corrective justice theories can be harmonized with a civil recourse approach 
if civil recourse is appropriately limited. For a recent account of how corrective justice and 
a conception of civil recourse can be harmonized, see Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and 
Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163 (2011).  
 11. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 1, at 714-18. 
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wronged them. Given that the state typically precludes individuals 
from exercising self-help on their own, the private right of action is a 
substitute means for a wronged party to act against a wrongdoer. 
 This is not to say that the traditional formulation of civil recourse 
theory offers an ideal explanation of all private law fields. The prin-
ciple of civil recourse has been challenged on normative grounds.12
And, as applied to nontort settings, it has been challenged on 
grounds of doctrinal fit.13 The originators of civil recourse theory have 
offered responses, however. In addition, new adherents have offered 
variations on the civil recourse account which address these chal-
lenges. What is significant is how civil recourse theory has evolved as 
a consequence. Over time, several components of civil recourse theory 
have been modified, or else elaborated in ways that differ from the 
original account. These variations are the subject of the present Article. 
 One way of looking at the emergence of these new civil recourse 
theories is to see them as responses to perceived challenges for the 
original theory. Alternatively, it may be that civil recourse theory has 
uncovered several distinct intuitions about what it means to “act 
against” another. Once we delve into the idea of recourse, it appar-
ently includes several perspectives, and each of these perspectives is 
recognizable from outside the legal domain. Our legal system may 
draw on more than one of these nonlegal conceptions of how a 
wronged party can appropriately respond to being wronged, and civil 
recourse theory may now reflect these multiple conceptions.
 Whatever the cause, it is increasingly clear that civil recourse the-
ory is not one theory, but several. The next Part of this Article will 
briefly delineate three primary conceptions of civil recourse. As will 
become clear, the differences between these conceptions are not mi-
nor. Each form of recourse instantiates a separate norm, and each 
has its own remedial implications. 
III.   DISTINGUISHING CONCEPTIONS OF CIVIL RECOURSE
A.   Civil Recourse as Enforcement 
 Given its origins, it is unsurprising that tort law dominates civil 
recourse theory. One civil recourse divide opens up when we attempt 
to account for other fields within private law, such as contract law or 
unjust enrichment.14 Contract law is not generally seen as an area of 
 12. See infra notes 42 and 46 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Gold, supra note 2, at 1917 (suggesting civil recourse theory, in its traditional 
form, does not adequately explain contract law). 
 14. Indeed, one of the alleged bases for adopting civil recourse theory—the distinction 
between a liability and a duty to pay—is substantially weaker in the contract and un-
just enrichment settings. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 1, at 719-20 (suggesting 
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law that concerns a wronged party’s right to “act against” another, at 
least not if “acting against” another is taken to mean responding to 
an affront, demanding satisfaction, or otherwise answering a wrong 
by holding the wrongdoer accountable.15 Contract law is more readily 
seen in terms of enforcing agreements. Thus, if contract law is ex-
plainable in terms of civil recourse, our idea of recourse may need to 
incorporate an enforcement concept. 
 Consider the following hypothetical case. In a prelegal society, 
Jack and Jill reach an agreement. Jack wishes to have his house 
built, and Jill is skilled in construction. In turn, Jill wishes to have a 
table that Jack owns. Jack and Jill agree that Jill will help build 
Jack’s house, and in return Jack will give Jill the table. After days of 
difficult labor, Jill successfully builds Jack’s house. It is clear that 
she has met the terms of the agreement, and Jack admits as much. 
However, Jack refuses to provide the table.16
 Under these circumstances, Jill initially has a primary moral 
right to the performance of the agreement—that is, to Jack handing 
over the table. Jill also has a remedial moral right to receive the ta-
ble, assuming Jack breaches. Yet, Jack might refuse to comply with 
his remedial duty. This, in turn, implicates an additional moral con-
cept. Under a commonly held view of morality, Jill would then be 
able to legitimately take the table, given Jack’s unwillingness to 
hand it over.17 This latter privilege is a matter of enforcement and 
will be referred to here as a moral enforcement right. 
 We can imagine a bystander asking Jill: “So, are you going to find 
some way to hold Jack accountable? His lack of respect for you is just 
unacceptable.” Jill might respond: “I’m not really interested in 
whether Jack is held accountable. I just want the table he owes me.” 
Of course, Jill might also wish to hold Jack accountable for his 
wrongful conduct. The point is that, for present purposes, such ac-
countability is a side issue. She is less concerned with righting the 
                                                                                                                  
that a duty to pay is ripe prior to a monetary judgment in these areas, but not in the tort 
law setting). 
 15. This is not to deny that, in certain circumstances, contract breaches do implicate 
moral outrage. On this topic, see Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach is for 
Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1003 (2010) (studying the psychological impact of contract breaches). 
 16. For further discussion of this hypothetical, see Gold, supra note 2, at 1877-80. 
 17. This presumes that the manner of taking the table would not cause unnecessary 
or disproportionate harm to Jack. I discuss this issue further in a draft paper. See Andrew 
S. Gold, A Theory of Redressive Justice (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1940594. Some theorists may also argue that Jack 
could appropriately resist Jill’s enforcement efforts in a state of nature. Cf. Arthur Rip-
stein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1415-21 
(2006) [hereinafter Ripstein, Private Order]. This latter view, however, need not preclude 
the position that civil recourse is grounded in a principle of enforcement. 
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wrong than with righting the wrongful loss by taking the table. And, 
if that is so, her privilege to take the table implicates a distinct norm. 
 Notice that, on this view, Jill is not necessarily worried about the 
affront of being wronged. Nor is resentment necessarily a driving 
force for her conduct.18 She wants the table. The moral concern, for 
present purposes, lies with the legitimacy of those acts she might 
take to correct the wrongful loss she has suffered due to Jack’s 
breach. On this account, the central issue is not the redress of wrongs 
as such, but the redress of wrongful losses.19
 If we interpret private rights of action—and civil recourse—in 
terms of legitimately held enforcement rights, a significant number of 
legal doctrines can be explained.20 In contract law, it is possible to 
explain the consideration doctrine, as well as the prevalence of the 
expectation damages remedy over other types of compensation.21 It is 
also possible to explain the judicial tendency to award expectation 
damages in lieu of specific performance.22 In each case, the substan-
tive standing of the plaintiff to bring suit also makes sense.23 In 
short, the legal enforcement right tracks a moral enforcement right. 
 We can understand Jill to be “acting against” Jack when she takes 
the table (through legal or nonlegal means). From this perspective, in 
providing for a private right of action, the law of contracts is recog-
nizing a legal entitlement in a party who would, in a state of nature, 
possess a moral enforcement right. The legal entitlement empowers 
the plaintiff to act through the state to repair the wrongful losses suf-
fered due to a breach of contract. Her private right of action, then, 
offers a civil means to “act against” a wrongdoer (with “acting 
against” understood in enforcement terms). Since self-help is ordinari-
 18. For a civil recourse approach that draws a connection between resentment of 
wrongs and tort law, see Solomon, supra note 2, at 1785-90. 
 19. Cf. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 325 (1992) (discussing a corrective 
justice concern with correcting wrongful losses, rather than wrongs as such). 
 20. In Hohfeldian terms, this could be a privilege. However, it is a privilege that is 
also joined by a duty of noninterference, and I will refer to enforcement rights with this 
understanding of their implications. For further discussion, see Gold, supra note 2, at 
1903 n.144. 
 21. See Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 42-43 
(2009) (addressing the prevalence of expectation remedies); id. at 43-44 (discussing the 
consideration doctrine). 
 22. See id. at 53-58 (discussing how a promisee’s ownership interest in promised per-
formance may be trumped by the import of the promisor’s autonomy in certain circumstances). 
 23. Here I draw on the work of Stephen Darwall and Margaret Gilbert. See Gold, su-
pra note 2, at 26 (citing STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT 18 (2006); 
Margaret Gilbert, Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees’ Rights,
101 J. PHIL. 83, 99-101 (2004)). Both provide helpful examples of situations in which moral 
intuitions would support a special standing on the part of a right holder. 
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ly prohibited by the state, the state provides an entitlement to enforce 
the deal (or the monetary equivalent) through a private right of action.24
 I will refer to this account as an “enforcement account” of civil re-
course. A theory of this type links our understanding of recourse to a 
commonly held moral perspective.25 It is a perspective grounded in 
moral rights. And this view has interpretive benefits, especially in 
the contract law setting. We can understand the wronged party in 
contract cases to have a special moral standing to enforce the agree-
ment. Moreover, while the morality of private enforcement is no 
doubt controversial,26 it is not counterintuitive in the way that a re-
venge-based view of contract law remedies would be. 
 Ordinary contract breaches are poor cases for vengeance, especial-
ly where the breach may be inadvertent or hard to avoid. Indeed, 
even the notion of “getting satisfaction” is a questionable fit for much 
of contract law. Broken contracts often implicate accountability, but 
contractual promisors are strictly liable for breach. As a result, in 
some cases it is doubtful whether a broken contract even involves an 
affront to the wrongdoer sufficient to support resentment. An indi-
vidual may, nevertheless, have an entitlement to enforce a contract 
through specific performance or expectation damages. 
 The fact that courts could sincerely believe they are recognizing a 
moral entitlement thus counts in favor of the enforcement account of 
recourse as an explanation of contract law. Courts could plausibly be 
drawing on this conventional moral perspective. Although some theo-
rists reject a unilateral standing to enforce on the part of a wronged 
individual,27 the idea that we have a natural right of redress in certain 
cases is, for many people, intuitively reasonable. That understanding, 
in appropriate cases, will implicate enforcement. 
 In addition, such an account allows us to address a variety of pri-
vate law fields which civil recourse theory is otherwise poorly suited 
to explain. Even if we feel that a revenge-based or accountability-
based view of civil recourse fits certain areas of the law, it is a poor 
fit not only for the run of the mill contract case, but potentially also 
for many negligence cases.28 A revenge-based or accountability-based 
 24. For helpful discussion of this Lockean structure, see Zipursky, Private Law, supra
note 1, at 637-40; Goldberg, supra note 1, at 541-45. 
 25. This link to a commonly held moral perspective can also have interpretive ad-
vantages. Cf. STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 13-24 (2004) (describing a “morality 
criterion” for interpretive theories of law). 
 26. See Ripstein, Private Order, supra note 17, at 1415-21 (discussing the legitimacy 
of unilateral enforcement by parties). 
 27. See id.
 28. With regard to revenge, compare Solomon, supra note 2, at 1813 (suggesting that 
“there is little if any evidence that the motive of most tort plaintiffs is to make the defend-
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form of civil recourse is also a questionable basis for injunctive relief, 
for in these cases no wrong has occurred. The plaintiff is not trying to 
hold another party responsible—the plaintiff is instead trying to 
make sure that her rights will be respected. Again, a notion of en-
forcement rights is a better fit than a notion that the plaintiff is 
being enabled by the state to hold someone accountable for that 
person’s wrongdoing. 
 Furthermore, an enforcement account of recourse explains the 
standardization of remedies prevalent in certain private law fields. 
When we consider contract law, this is an important benefit. Civil 
recourse theorists have often argued that their approach is superior 
to a corrective justice approach in light of the diverse remedies tort 
law provides. That diversity is thought to fit well with a form of re-
course that emphasizes accountability. Contract law is not nearly so 
diverse in its remedies, however, and this suggests a different kind of 
recourse is operating in the contractual context. While we can draw 
conceptual inferences from the remedies which private law courts 
apply, these inferences are as valid where remedies are homogenous 
as they are in cases where remedies are diverse.  
 Why is it that contract law so consistently adopts the expectation 
remedy? Shouldn’t accountability sometimes call for more damages, 
or less? Although the variability in remedies gives civil recourse an 
advantage over corrective justice accounts in the tort arena, the ab-
sence of this variability is meaningful in the contract arena. Civil re-
course theorists may respond that damages designed to make some-
one whole are simply an outer boundary on acceptable recourse,29 but 
this raises a further question: why should there be such an outer 
boundary? It seems like a remarkable coincidence that the outer 
boundary should fit so well with the value of a contractual promise.30
 An answer to these challenges is to adopt a civil recourse theory 
that derives the legal right of action from a moral enforcement right. 
Enforcement rights suggest that specific performance, or the equiva-
lent in value, will be the type of remedy selected in the majority of 
contract cases. The expectation remedy undoes wrongful losses, and 
it is this outcome which, in the typical contracts case, a plaintiff 
                                                                                                                  
ant ‘suffer’ at all, and they certainly do not wish for the defendant to suffer in the way that 
they have”). 
 29. See Oman, supra note 2, at 533 (explaining that civil recourse theory “views ex-
pectation damages as an upper limit on retaliation by plaintiffs against defendants”); 
Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 1, at 947 (suggesting, in tort settings, 
that “the victim’s loss normally sets the outer boundary of the remedy that courts will pro-
vide to victims of wrongs when they successfully sue those who wrong them”). 
 30. The problem, if anything, is more pronounced when we consider the law of unjust 
enrichment. See Gold, supra note 2, at 1917-19 (discussing unjust enrichment and civil 
recourse theory). 
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would be morally entitled to insist upon.31 A focus on enforcement 
also helps explain why compensatory damages—designed to make 
the plaintiff whole—should have such a central place in tort law. Tort 
law may not solely implicate the undoing of wrongful losses, but this 
is at least a central theme of tort law.32 From the enforcement per-
spective, this remedial feature is predictable. 
 As this discussion suggests, a focus on enforcement differs from 
the common understanding of civil recourse.33 The enforcement ac-
count of civil recourse theory is generally concerned with undoing 
wrongful losses, rather than the wrong itself.34 The enforcement ac-
count has the advantage of treating compensatory damages as an 
implication of recourse, rather than as a rule of thumb or as a pru-
dential boundary. Further, the enforcement account explains the 
standardization of certain private law remedies as an inferential out-
come of civil recourse itself. 
B.   Civil Recourse as Accountability 
 The enforcement account is different from the way in which civil 
recourse proponents have conventionally described their theory. The 
enforcement account addresses a form of recourse typically concerned 
with undoing wrongful losses. The plaintiff’s remedy, and the basis 
for that remedy, therefore varies from the standard conception of re-
course. Under the enforcement approach, a wronged party’s private 
right of action is derived from her enforcement right, and not from 
the resentment the wronged party feels about being wronged, nor 
from the wronged party’s need to hold the wrongdoer accountable. 
 31. For an argument that contract law can be seen in terms of loss allocation from a 
corrective justice perspective, see Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Cor-
rective Justice in Contract Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3013, 3020 (2007). Bridgeman’s ar-
gument is similar in some respects to the argument I am endorsing, but developed in terms 
of corrective justice rather than civil recourse. 
 32. In this respect, I agree with those corrective justice theories which emphasize loss 
allocation. Cf. COLEMAN, supra note 19; Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort 
Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992). 
 33. It may well be questioned whether this enforcement-based account is a civil re-
course theory. Cf. Gold, supra note 2, at 1876-81 (suggesting a focus on enforcement rights 
as an alternative to the civil recourse approach, as conventionally stated). That said, 
several private law theorists view the above enforcement-based conception as implicat-
ing a form of civil recourse. In addition, the concept of civil recourse seems capable of in-
cluding enforcement. The enforcement account nonetheless gives us a different recourse 
principle from the idea of getting satisfaction that is often associated with the phrase “civil 
recourse theory.” 
 34. In some cases, such as injunctive relief, this notion of recourse would serve a dif-
ferent purpose. In an injunctive relief case, enforcement would involve a primary right, and 
it would predate a wrong. For further discussion of injunctive relief as it relates to civil 
recourse theory, see Gold, supra note 2, at 1915 (noting that injunctions are “[not] a clear 
case of acting against another, at least not in the usual civil recourse sense”). 
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 In contrast, repairing losses is not a focal point for traditional civil 
recourse theory. Instead, it is the redress of wrongs as such. This is 
amply demonstrated in a recent paper by John Goldberg and Benja-
min Zipursky. In Torts as Wrongs, they note that loss allocation is an 
important component of many corrective justice accounts.35 And they 
argue that civil recourse theory is superior to these corrective justice 
theories in part because civil recourse theory emphasizes wrongs, 
and not allocation of wrongful losses. 
 In the tort setting, this focus on redress of wrongs has advantages. 
As Goldberg and Zipursky note, in tort law there are a variety of 
well-recognized, nonperipheral torts which cannot easily be explained 
in terms of loss allocation. For example, there are cases of trespass 
and battery in which no apparent losses are suffered, yet damages 
are available.36 In addition, Goldberg and Zipursky suggest that 
there are cases in which courts “make whole” the plaintiff through 
compensation for harms that do not adequately translate into a loss 
allocation rubric.37 Goldberg and Zipursky thus contend that their 
civil recourse account is superior to several leading corrective jus-
tice accounts because a loss allocation approach is a poor fit for tort 
law doctrine. 
 Given this concern with redress for wrongs as such, we can readily 
see that the traditional conception of recourse is not about enforce-
ment. What, then, is the traditional conception? Classic civil recourse 
theory suggests that a wronged party should be able to respond to the 
affront of being wronged.38 “Acting against” the defendant is a way 
that the wronged party can hold a wrongdoer accountable for wrong-
ing the plaintiff. Or, in another formulation, it is a way that the 
 35. See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 1, at 925-26 (citing COLE-
MAN, supra note 19, at 329; ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW
48-58 (1999); Perry, supra note 31, at 449-50). It should be noted that Goldberg & Zipursky 
express some uncertainty whether Arthur Ripstein’s current position falls into this catego-
ry. See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 1, at 928 n. 68; cf. Arthur Rip-
stein, As If It Had Never Happened, 48 WM & MARY L. REV. 1957 (2007). As they note, 
however, Ernest Weinrib’s corrective justice account of tort law is concerned with wrongs. 
Cf. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 134-35 (1995). 
 36. See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 1, at 954 (noting torts 
which “do not set loss as a condition of liability”). 
 37. See id. at 960-61. 
 38. See Zipursky, Rights, supra note 1, at 87 (“The answer is that entitlement to re-
course does not spring from the need precipitated by injury. It springs from the affront of 
being wronged by another.”). 
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wronged party can get satisfaction.39 I will refer to this conception as 
the “accountability” view of civil recourse.40
 Although redress of wrongs is at the core of the accountability 
view, this approach to civil recourse does not argue that private 
rights of action are grounded in revenge. Accountability and revenge 
are not the same thing.41 They are conceptually different, and they 
have distinct normative implications. Indeed, the ability to explain 
civil recourse without linking it to revenge is an important result for 
civil recourse theories precisely because of the normative implica-
tions. Revenge is a highly controversial basis for private rights of ac-
tion, and the concern that recourse may be about revenge has drawn 
significant criticism of the recourse approach. 
 For example, John Finnis has recently critiqued civil recourse 
theory on the ground that it views revenge as an appropriate justifi-
cation for the state’s involvement in private disputes. As Finnis ar-
gues: “At its root recourse theory treats as worthy the emotional im-
pulse of [the] victim of wrongdoing to ‘get even,’ by ‘act[ing] 
against’—having recourse against—the rights violator.”42 Assuming 
the premises of this argument, it offers an important challenge for 
recourse-based explanations of private law. On the other hand, if civil 
recourse is not about revenge, this would be one way, perhaps, of 
avoiding Finnis’s critique.43
 Unsurprisingly, civil recourse theorists have been careful to dis-
tinguish their elaboration of recourse principles from a justification 
of revenge. Goldberg and Zipursky suggest that civil recourse in-
volves a principle such that tort victims may “demand redress or sat-
 39. Cf. Goldberg & Zipursky, Moral Luck, supra note 1, at 1162 (describing tort vic-
tims who have been “injured in a way that warrants their thinking that someone else is 
responsible for mistreating them and that their wrongdoer is an appropriate person from 
whom to demand redress or satisfaction”). 
 40. One might also describe this as a “wrongs-based” conception of recourse. However, 
the private revenge understanding, described below, is also a wrongs-based view of re-
course, and it differs significantly from the accountability view of civil recourse. 
 41. Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society,
64 MD. L. REV. 364, 406 (2005) (denying that the idea of civil recourse is a way of referring 
to vengeance). 
 42. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 1, at 1, 55-58 (altera-
tion in original) (citation omitted) (critiquing civil recourse accounts on the theory that 
they treat as worthy the impulse to get even); see also Emily Sherwin, Compensation and 
Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1406-13 (2003) (concluding that retributive actions 
may be justifiable, but critiquing acts of private revenge). 
 43. Another possibility would be to defend revenge. Cf. PETER A. FRENCH, THE VIR-
TUES OF VENGEANCE 89-91 (2001); see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN: FOR-
GIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 17-26 (2003) (suggesting that vindictive behavior is not always 
irrational or immoral). 
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isfaction.”44 Zipursky notes that in describing the principle of civil 
recourse, he is in no way supporting the normative position that tort 
law serves the function of “permitting vengeful desires to be satisfied 
in a civil system.”45 While the initiation of a suit may often be linked 
to a plaintiff’s desire for revenge, Goldberg and Zipursky’s account is 
not about the endorsement of vengeful desires.46
 Jason Solomon, in turn, defends civil recourse on normative 
grounds. He understands tort law to be a system of equal accounta-
bility. In Solomon’s view, Finnis’s critique calls for a “morally appeal-
ing norm and political justification” in support of civil recourse.47
Drawing on Stephen Darwall’s account of second-person morality, 
Solomon suggests that tort law involves a “demand for some kind of 
answer and measure of justice,” rather than “the infliction of a like 
injury.”48 In his view, tort law is not about the state supporting an 
urge to retaliate, but instead about the state supporting “the instinct 
to hold another accountable.”49
 We can accordingly discern a distinct, non-revenge-based concep-
tion of civil recourse. It is an accountability-based conception, and it 
has its own interpretive strengths. The conception of civil recourse in 
terms of holding a wrongdoer accountable has the advantage of ex-
plaining a large variety of remedies characteristic of tort law. Sym-
bolic remedies, on the one hand, and punitive damages, on the other, 
are both explicable in terms of a wronged party’s entitlement to act 
against a wrongdoer in a civil, proportionate manner. Likewise, com-
pensatory tort damages can be addressed as a type of accountability. 
C.   Civil Recourse as a Means for Revenge 
 Yet, as civil recourse theorists have distanced their approaches 
from a revenge-oriented approach, another divide becomes evident. 
Not all theorists are troubled by the idea of private rights of action as 
a means of obtaining revenge. In some contexts, the idea of an enti-
tlement to pursue vindictive impulses may be a very good fit with 
legal doctrine, and it may also be justified under certain theories of 
 44. See Goldberg & Zipursky, Moral Luck, supra note 1, at 1162. 
 45. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 1, at 737. 
 46. The fact that civil recourse theorists do not all view recourse in terms of revenge—
and that they offer an interpretive, rather than a normative, account—does not necessarily 
resolve the morality concern, however. As Stephen Smith has argued, it is reasonable to 
think that a good interpretive account will involve legal principles that judges could at 
least sincerely believe are morally legitimate. See SMITH, supra note 25, at 18-19. Conse-
quently, whether it is grounded in revenge or “satisfaction,” civil recourse theory must 
contend with the question of moral plausibility. 
 47. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1781. 
 48. See id. at 1814 (emphasis omitted). 
 49. Id.
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justice. Revenge may be particularly relevant in the remedial setting. 
Punitive damages, Anthony Sebok has argued, can readily be ex-
plained in terms of revenge.50
 Efforts to link punitive damages and retributive norms predate 
civil recourse theory. If one thinks that punitive damages are retribu-
tive, one might argue that punitive damages are a means by which 
plaintiffs punish certain torts on behalf of the state.51 Sebok, howev-
er, suggests that public retribution is an inadequate explanation of 
punitive damages. As he notes, claims in tort are personal.52 Sebok 
instead concludes that it is private revenge which accounts for punitive 
damages, and, in doing so, he offers a distinct theory of civil recourse. 
 Drawing on Jean Hampton’s theory of retribution, Sebok contends 
that punitive damages may serve a compensatory function.53 But in 
the punitive damages setting, he indicates that it is private revenge 
which is truly at stake, rather than public retribution. Punitive dam-
ages are, on this account, a means of providing a victim with redress 
where there was a willful violation of the victim’s rights.54 The vic-
tim’s role in bringing the case is important, for it allows her to “make 
claims about the rightful treatment that she was owed.”55 On this 
understanding, the legal system “is underwriting the victim’s right to 
decide whether and how the wrongdoer will suffer punishment.”56
 Among other concerns, the role of emotions can raise doubts about 
the desirability of revenge as a ground for legal actions. Emotions are 
often thought to distort our reasoning where revenge is at issue. Yet 
Sebok suggests that the connection between revenge and the 
wronged party’s emotions need not rule out an explanation of puni-
tive damages that is premised on revenge.57 The legal process medi-
ates such emotions, and, in any event, the underlying moral judg-
ments about the injustice of a case may still be accurate.58
 Granting these points, Sebok’s argument may still raise concerns 
of the type that Finnis offers. The effect of emotions on our reasoning 
powers is only one basis for questioning a legal venue for private re-
venge. Nevertheless, Sebok’s account has the advantage of providing 
 50. See Sebok, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 51. See id. at 1026 (discussing this theory). 
 52. See id. (noting that “[c]laims of wrongfulness in tort are personal”). 
 53. See id. at 1023 (citing Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: 
The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1992)). 
 54. See id. at 1028 (“The theory of civil redress should provide a . . . reason for giving 
to the victim of a willful violation of a protected interest the power to claim that the court 
should annul the wrong through punishment.”). 
 55. Id.
 56. Id.
 57. See id. at 1021. 
 58. See id. at 1020-21. 
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an especially good fit with legal doctrine in the punitive damages 
context. As an interpretive matter, this doctrinal fit can be meaning-
ful, even if the normative concerns are legitimate.  
 This Article will not debate the moral merits of revenge. That 
said, it matters whether civil recourse is best seen as part of a system 
for the pursuit of revenge, even if this only occurs in a subset of pri-
vate law. Revenge is not the same sort of norm as accountability, and 
it is significantly more controversial. Whatever its explanatory 
strengths in the realm of punitive damages, revenge is a questionable 
basis for private rights of action outside of the punitive damages con-
text. Indeed, if revenge is the best explanation of punitive damages, 
this presents a potential difficulty for civil recourse theory. 
 Notice that if civil recourse theory were to carve out an area of 
doctrine that is grounded on principles of revenge, while explaining 
the rest of tort law without reliance on such principles, it could open 
itself up to a criticism often levied against corrective justice theories. 
Civil recourse theory would arguably be cordoning off an area of tort 
law for separate interpretive treatment.59 Civil recourse theorists 
have been highly skeptical of such interpretive line-drawing. On the 
other hand, civil recourse theory cannot plausibly suggest that all of 
tort law (let alone all of private law) is grounded on revenge. It is 
quite counterintuitive to think that an ordinary negligence case 
would merit revenge, let alone that such cases are best explained in 
such terms. It would be even more counterintuitive to suggest that 
cases of innocent trespass are apt cases for revenge, or that ordinary 
cases of contractual breach are well suited for retribution. The re-
venge based reading of civil recourse is thus not only a distinctive 
reading, but can also present challenges for civil recourse theory as a 
theory of private law. 
IV.   TOWARD A PLURALISTIC ACCOUNT OF CIVIL RECOURSE
 As the above discussion suggests, there are notable differences 
between civil recourse as enforcement, as accountability, or even as 
revenge. None of these approaches are readily reducible into the oth-
ers.60 And, furthermore, there are unique explanatory advantages to 
each approach. In light of their respective strengths and weaknesses, 
which civil recourse theory should be adopted? 
 59. Cf. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 1, at 712-13 (suggesting that corrective 
justice theorists may not simply treat punitive damages as a graft onto private law). 
 60. It is possible, however, that one could view accountability and revenge as two 
different ways in which wrongs are annulled, dependent upon context. See Sebok, supra
note 2, at 1028 (suggesting that compensation for simple negligence, and punitive damages 
for willful wrongs, are both means of annulling a wrong). 
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 One could plausibly say that any of the above-described civil re-
course accounts meet a threshold doctrinal fit requirement.61 Like-
wise, they all have areas where they must address peripheral cases. 
The primary distinctions involve which cases each theory views as 
peripheral. Each civil recourse theory is able to account for one of the 
most basic structural features of private law: the private right of ac-
tion. Each is able to account for substantive standing. And each is 
able to account for the concepts of rights, duties, wrongs, and reme-
dies which permeate private law discourse. Where they tend to differ 
is in their explanations of particular remedies, and the normative 
plausibility of adopting such remedies for the wrongs at issue. 
 The difficulty for each approach is in the explanation of specific 
subparts of private law. How well does each theory explain the expec-
tation remedy in contract law? The consideration doctrine? How well 
does each theory address damages for trespass cases where no harm 
was suffered that is capable of being allocated? How well does each 
theory address punitive damages? Injunctive relief? 
 All three conceptions of civil recourse offer insights that might be 
lost if we adopted only one variant. For this reason, we should avoid 
doing so. But what other options are there for civil recourse theory? A 
potential option would be to adopt the principle of civil recourse in 
very general terms. If it holds a sufficiently general meaning, re-
course might cover enforcement of moral rights, accountability for 
wrongs committed, or even revenge. The right of recourse might be 
grounded in the wronged party’s resentment, the aptness of her reac-
tion to being wronged, or the morality of her claim to enforcement. 
“Acting against” another might include the coercion required in the 
recovery of property, in enforcement of agreements, in holding anoth-
er accountable, or in obtaining punitive damages. 
 In other words, one could think of civil recourse in abstract terms. 
A generalized civil recourse approach—one which looks for principles 
common to each of the above civil recourse conceptions (such as en-
forcement, accountability, and revenge)—would be a way to account 
for a very large swath of private law. The main difficulty is that this 
approach would give us little guidance with respect to outcomes in 
particular cases. The principle of civil recourse would not tell us when 
punitive damages are fitting, for example. It would not tell us when 
allocation of losses is more appropriate than subcompensatory or su-
 61. For a helpful discussion of fit criteria for interpretive theories of private law, see 
William Lucy, Method and Fit: Two Problems for Contemporary Philosophies of Tort Law,
52 MCGILL L.J. 605 (2007). 
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percompensatory remedies. Without more, an abstract conception of 
recourse would offer a highly indeterminate account of private law.62
 Yet this is not necessarily cause for pessimism. Arguably, a form 
of pluralism would work as an alternative, with several distinct re-
course norms coexisting in the private law doctrine. It seems unlikely 
that there is a workable principle for weighing one recourse norm 
against another,63 but it may be possible to ascertain the types of sit-
uation in which particular recourse norms are most apt. There may 
be particular fields and subfields of private law where particular con-
ceptions of recourse theory fit better than others.
 First, consider a contracts case in which the promisor is forced by 
circumstances to breach despite acting in good faith.64 The enforce-
ment notion of recourse works well here. The promisee owns a right 
to performance, or at least has a right to the next best thing, regard-
less of the promisor’s good intentions. Indeed, the enforcement notion 
of recourse is especially well-suited to cases in which the plaintiff has 
a proprietary interest at stake (whether it is an interest in perfor-
mance or an interest in tangible assets). This notion of recourse is 
applicable even in the absence of misconduct on the part of the de-
fendant. And, even if accountability norms are potentially applicable 
in such cases, the expectation remedy is a more obvious inference 
from the enforcement conception. 
 Second, consider a tort case where there have been no wrongful 
losses, or at least none which may readily be allocated. Suppose it is 
a case of accidental trespass on land and that the trespass caused no 
discernible change in the parcel of land at issue.65 Assume the plain-
tiff seeks damages. The enforcement conception of recourse does not 
work especially well in this setting. Notice also that the idea of re-
venge would be appalling under the circumstances—it is very unlike-
 62. As Jody Kraus suggests, indeterminacy concerns may also be a reason to question 
the strength of an interpretive account. See Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy 
in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis,
93 VA. L. REV. 287 (2007). 
 63. Cf. Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 686 n.1 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, 
eds., 2002) (“The challenge for [pluralistic contract theories] like the challenge for pluralistic 
normative theories in general, is to explain how their explanations and justifications can be 
defended in the absence of a master principle for ordering the competing values they invoke.”). 
 64. For example, a widget producer might contract to provide widgets to a customer 
and then, due to mistaken but entirely innocent business judgments, the widget producer 
might be unable to deliver given a lack of funds. In such a case there can still be liability 
for breach, even if the widget producer is morally blameless, and even if the customer has 
no cause for resentment or desire for revenge. 
 65.  On the significance of innocent trespasses, see Goldberg & Zipursky, Moral Luck,
supra note 1, at 1145. On torts without losses, see Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs,
supra note 1, at 954-55.
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ly that a modern court would be applying a revenge-based conception 
to an innocent trespass, and it is questionable whether the plaintiff 
would be thinking of revenge. Yet, there is a plausible conception of 
civil recourse that works here. Recourse as accountability can explain 
why a private right of action could be available. 
 Third, consider a brutal case of intentional battery. In this case, 
the notion of private revenge that Sebok offers in his account of puni-
tive damages would likely fit the intuitions of many citizens, and this 
basis for the private right of action may also reflect the internal point 
of view for many courts. Putting aside the question of whether it is 
morally appropriate for courts to assist in revenge, and whether it is 
morally appropriate for the victim to engage in such conduct, the doc-
trinal fit is sufficiently strong (and, for some, the moral intuition may 
be as well) that a theory of revenge is at least plausible as an inter-
pretive matter.66
 Of course, we should be wary of an ad hoc pluralism in explaining 
private law. As John Goldberg suggests, “[c]ongenial pluralism” is a 
problematic answer to the grand theoretical debates over tort law.67
Much of the concern raised by the pluralism Goldberg critiques, how-
ever, is likely a product of the theoretical approaches under consider-
ation. We cannot readily discern a metaprinciple to address conflicts 
between, for example, consequentialist approaches and corrective 
justice approaches.68 And, to simply balance these very distinct con-
ceptions against each other produces an undesirable incoherence in 
the law.69
 That said, there may well be room for pluralism within civil re-
course theory, and this pluralism need not require a balancing or 
weighing of interests. A civil recourse pluralism may instead track 
commonly held intuitions about when a particular type of recourse is 
justified, or at least, when a particular type is an apt response to a 
given wrong. On this basis, one might conclude that an enforcement 
conception of civil recourse is a good fit for contract law, unjust en-
richment, and certain tort remedies. One might conclude that an ac-
countability-based civil recourse is a good fit for many other tort 
 66. Note that there may also be cases in which more than one category of recourse 
plausibly applies. In many such cases, the amount of damages implicated by one category 
may also satisfy the amount implicated by another. For example, an enforcement-based 
form of recourse may also fully meet the requirements of accountability. In other cases, 
remedies may be cumulative, as with a tort claim that results in both compensatory and 
punitive damages. 
 67. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 579-80 (2003). 
 68. Cf. id. at 580 (noting the types of conflict which may arise between leading theories). 
 69. See id. (discussing the importance of the aspiration to coherence). 
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remedies. And, one might conclude in some cases that an outlet for 
private revenge is a good fit for the legal doctrine of punitive damages. 
 Goldberg and Zipursky recognize the “Hodgepodge Problem” that 
civil recourse theories face: there are a huge variety of interests 
which tort law covers.70 Tort law is not just negligence law. Tort law 
also covers dignitary harms, intentional torts, tortious interference 
with contracts, and fraud. They argue, nevertheless, that civil re-
course theory has the resources to address the Hodgepodge Problem. 
I agree. But, I would also consider the problem from a different angle. 
Tort law, and private law generally, can incorporate a variety of 
forms of civil recourse. 
V. CONCLUSION
 Civil recourse theory has provided ground-breaking insights into 
tort law—and private law—by augmenting the insights of corrective 
justice theory. Civil recourse theory, like corrective justice theory, 
recognizes that private law fields have a conceptual structure that 
includes relational rights and duties, wrongs, and remedies. Yet, pri-
vate law is also built around the idea of a private right of action, and 
it is characteristically only available to the individual whose rights 
have been violated, or are likely to be violated in the near future. In 
addition, certain areas of private law show a great variety of remedi-
al options. Civil recourse theory makes sense of these features. 
 The principle of civil recourse, however, raises its own set of con-
cerns. Perhaps in response to these concerns, civil recourse theory 
has begun developing into several distinct theories. The principle of 
civil recourse is now open to more than one interpretation. Some con-
ceptions of recourse, especially where revenge is at issue, raise moral 
qualms. These qualms may cause us to doubt that the legal point of 
view truly incorporates such visions of recourse. Some conceptions of 
recourse are a poor fit with the remedial doctrines of nontort fields. 
These latter conceptions of recourse seem tailor-made to explain tort 
law, or punitive damages, but fit poorly with standard understand-
ings of contract law or unjust enrichment. 
 The growing number of recourse conceptions does not, ultimately, 
mean that any individual civil recourse theory has adequately met its 
explanatory goals. Once our focus includes private law as a whole, 
there is no single conception of civil recourse that seems to fully cover 
the field—at least not without distorting the legal doctrines under 
scrutiny. This poses a substantial challenge. Civil recourse theorists 
have been appropriately concerned that the subject of an interpretive 
 70. See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 1, at 921-30. 
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legal theory should not be artificially curtailed so that the theory fits 
what it seeks to explain. 
 Even so, this Article suggests that civil recourse theory is suffi-
ciently versatile to respond to these challenges. Civil recourse theo-
rists are rightly cautious about adopting a pluralistic interpretation 
of private law. It may nevertheless be that a pluralistic approach to 
recourse theory is the best option we have, and the most descriptively 
accurate. Many different fact patterns will support a private right of 
action in tort law—some of these fact patterns may, in predictable 
fashion, support a particular type of recourse. If so, studying which 
type of recourse is appropriate should offer an opportunity to enrich 
civil recourse theory, and perhaps also to better address those areas 
in which it occasionally stumbles. 
